Quote: (04-30-2013 11:03 AM)Vicious Wrote:
Quote: (04-30-2013 06:09 AM)T and A Man Wrote:
If you don't know what I meant by Fall Gelb,it was a close replica of the Schliffen plan, yes. .. with the first draft having Army Group A heading south of Luxembourg and rushing headlong into the northern tip of the maginot line.
I believe you are confused, likely you are thinking of the Dyle-Breda plan. Case Yellow was the name of the operation that was carried out.
No, I said Fall Gelb, not manstein plan.
Just as OKW always had Fall Weiss for Poland, dating back to the 1920's, and Fall Grun, if the incursion onto Czechesklovakia turned into war, as well as Fall Rot for defence against France coming to the aid of the Czechs.
Fall Gelb was the OKW directive to attack France/Western Europe, it always had been. These 'plan's are strategic, not operational.
How this operation would be conducted would be further refined.
The orginal Fall Gelb, by Halder, used a reinterpretation of the Schliffen Plan with two army groups.
In late 1939, from the link you posted, Hitler overturned in, asking for "Aufmarschanweisung N°2, Fall Gelb,"
As I said, one of them saw the sourthen armour group splinter south of Luxembourg and rush headlong into the edge maginot line. It happaned that a plane carrying these revised 2nd plans landed in Belgium during Sitzkrieg and the allies captured the plans.
Thus the operational conduct of Plan Gelb was altered, this time using the Manstein plan, the fourth operational plan of Fall Gelb.
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Like I said just google it:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France
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In the first [part of the Battle of France], Fall Gelb (Case Yellow), German armoured units pushed through the Ardennes to cut off and surround the Allied units that had advanced into Belgium. When British and adjacent French forces were pushed back to the sea by the highly mobile and well organised German operation, the British government decided to evacuate the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) as well as several French divisions at Dunkirk in Operation Dynamo.
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The Schliffen plan was not the right idea, every allied plan was based on them expecting a repeat of it.
Which is why the first phase of Case Yellow was similar to the Schlieffen plan but deviated as the French had fallen into static, defensive positions.
The Schliffen plan was to was encircle the French army. If enacted, i would assetr this would not have been a good outcome as the (retreating) French forces, and the French strategic reserve would have masked the Maginot line.
The concentrated british force, + French 9th and 1st Armies would have been on the german right flank.
The Dyle plan (an allied operational plans) was made to counter a return of the schliffen plan.
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The father of early armoured doctrine was Liddell-Hart, not De Gaulle, and it was Liddell-Hart who inspired Guderian and Manstein.
Wrong again. That's a falsification by Lidell Hart that's been debunked since long. De Gaulle was a bigger inspiration on Guderian (and in turn Manstein). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blitzkrieg#...ddell_Hart
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Liddell Hart, in letters to Guderian, "imposed his own fabricated version of blitzkrieg on the latter and compelled him to proclaim it as original formula". Historian Kenneth Macksey found Liddell Hart's original letters to Guderian, in the General's papers, requesting that Guderian give him credit for "impressing him" with his ideas of armoured warfare. When Liddell Hart was questioned about this in 1968, and the discrepancy between the English and German editions of Guderian's memoirs, "he gave a conveniently unhelpful though strictly truthful reply. ('There is nothing about the matter in my file of correspondence with Guderian himself except...that I thanked him...for what he said in that additional paragraph'.)"
Which is why is said armoured doctrine, not Blitzkreig. You can look at his here;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blitzkrieg#...ddell_Hart
"It was the opposite of a doctrine. Blitzkrieg consisted of an avalanche of actions that were sorted out less by design and more by success. In hindsight—and with some help from Liddell Hart—this torrent of action was squeezed into something it never was: an operational design."
Liddell-Hart espoused operational doctrine, Blitzkrieg was not a doctrine. Liddell-Hart's works were all published long before De Gaulle made Colonel.
I agree Liddell-Hart tried to encompass more notoriety from his works by attempting to take credit for the german successes, but he still had the first published theories of armoured doctrine.